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Introduction
On 2 April 2015, a political framework agreement was reached over Iran's controversial nuclear programme. This was a first step in ending the more than decade-old odyssey of nuclear diplomacy with Iran. Following an unprecedented Iranian diplomatic outreach since the late summer 2013, the six world powers negotiating with Iran (the five permanent UN Security Council members plus Germany) had managed to agree on a common approach to seize the momentum of optimism generated by the election of Hassan Rouhani in June 2013.
A first interim agreement with Iran was reached on 24 November 2013. This display of 'P5+1' consensus had not always been the case. The political crisis over the Iranian nuclear programme was never only a dispute between Iran and an ill-defined 'international community', but reveals a much deeper-seated contention about the coexistence between 'the West' and other powers that challenge an essentially U.S.-dominated world order and its political paradigms. In the negotiation format that emerged when Iran's nuclear file was programme is illustrative of a security culture that resists hegemony. Proceeding from a neoGramscian understanding of hegemony, Russia's Iran policy will be analysed through the prism of Russia's interaction with the material, ideational, and institutional dimensions of hegemonic structures (see Cox, 1981, 139 ).
In light of Russia's self-understanding of its position in the international system of states, it thereby disentangles Russian foreign policy toward the Iranian nuclear programme as the outcome of a delicate balancing act between strategic engagement with 'the West' and adherence to foreign policy norms that partially clash with Western interests. The argument presented here thus nuances the idea that Russia acts as a revisionist state, aiming to challenge U.S.-dominated paradigms in international relations. It will be argued, instead, that Russian foreign policy towards Iran is the outcome of a balancing act between resistance to hegemony and hegemonic accommodation (cf. also Pieper 2014) . Not least because of traumatized USIranian relations and the centrality of the US in Iranian foreign policy discourse, Washington holds considerable sway over Iran's nuclear future. But also on a structural level, the omnipresence of US financial power in international governance and the extent to which this particular leverage shapes policy formulation of other actors creates what in this article will be called 'hegemonic structures'. These structures have met criticism and outright rejection by a range of actors, including Iran.
A first section process-traces the disagreements between Russia and its Western counterparts over diplomatic approaches to Iran's nuclear programme following the latter's disclosure in 2002 as an illustration of Western-Russian normative disagreements and Russia's reaction to an emerging U.S. securitisation of the Iranian nuclear issue. A second section analyses Russia's stance on unilateral and international sanctions on Iran against the background of Russo-Iranian bilateral relations, Russo-American relations and Moscow's understanding of the functioning of international security governance. This is an important analytical step for an examination of Russia's understanding of legitimacy in international politics. 'Norms and values' are understood here as concrete convictions and conceptions (such as 'sovereignty' or 'non-interference'), while 'rules and models' relate to the broader macro-structure that regulates the way these norms and values are communicated, applied, or changed (see Katzenstein, 1996, 21 (Yurtaev, 2005, 107) , but was abandoned in the wake of the Islamic Revolution (Orlov and Vinnikov, 2005, 50) . Unable to get nuclear technology from its former European partners that had cooperated with Iran in the starting phases of the Iranian nuclear programme under the Shah in the 1960s and 1970s, 3 Iran had turned to China and the USSR (with Russia succeeding the latter). As from the mid-1990s
and despite U.S. pressure, Russia had become Iran's nuclear partner (cf. also Sarukhanyan, 2006, 88-108) .
Against the backdrop of the uranium fuel sales for the construction of Bushehr, Putin appeared pugnacious and downplayed the revelations of a covert Iranian nuclear programme, calling nonproliferation concerns a 'means of squeezing Russian companies out of the Iranian market' in 2003 (Parker, 2009, 221) . Such a statement neatly captures the Russian zeitgeist at the time on the nexus between non-proliferation and legitimate nuclear cooperation that continued to underwrite Russian foreign policy in the Iranian nuclear dossier for the years to come: Russian economic benefits had to be weighed against political and security concerns of technology sales to Iran that might be of a dual-use nature. Russia's official position thus indicated non-compliance with the U.S. state of alert and apprehension regarding early signs of an emerging securitisation of the Iranian nuclear issue. It was already at this early juncture in the Iranian nuclear crisis that different security conceptions towards Iran's nuclear programme between the U.S. and Russia became apparent. If the rendition of enmity is an order-constituting and arguably hegemony-sustaining exercise (Agamben, 2002, 25) , publicly challenging such a process of securitisation is resistance to hegemony on a discursive level.
Terms such as the 'pursuance of national interests' therefore have to be understood as relational concepts: What reads as an act of defiance for hegemonic powers can be an act of necessary resistance against instrumental politicisations in a non-hegemonic reading. From the beginning of the nuclear stand-off in 2002, Putin repeatedly emphasised the Iranian right to nuclear power (Putin, 2003; Mousavian, 2012, 163 (Mousavian, 2012, 84; 141) . (Jafarzadeh, 2007, 159) , testimony to the failure of nuclear negotiations between
Iran and the EU3, the file was referred to the UNSC in March 2006. Of the 35 members of the IAEA Board of Governors, 27 endorsed the board resolution, of which Russia was one. The
Russian endorsement became possible after a reference to 'international peace and security' has been omitted. An earlier resolution had still contained the reference and was therefore vetoed by Russia (Fitzpatrick, 2006, 21) . The Iran nuclear case now had been transferred from Vienna to New York. Russia, hesitant to join the negotiations at first (International Crisis Group, 2006, 14) , was forced to take a stance by now at the latest by nature of its permanent Security Council membership.
In U.N. Security Council negotiations, Russia found itself in a camp with China arguing for a less pressuring approach to Iran than the U.S. and European countries were pushing for and argued against the adoption of a UNSC resolution (Patrikarakos, 2012, 224; Mousavian, 2012, 235) . In an attempt to broker a political solution to the crisis, Russia While Russia aimed at averting or at least slowing down international pressure on Iran, it aimed at slowing down Iran's advances in its nuclear programme at the same time. This was evidenced by the constant pushing back of the date of completion of the Bushehr power plant, which, on the surface of it, was attributed to 'technical' issues (Katz, 2010, 64; 2012, 58) , but was also read as a Russian sensitivity to US concerns (cf. also Nizameddin, 2013, 266) , and equally prolonged the Iranian dependence on Russian technology. 6 While this strategy can be read as a rational commercial calculation, it also served to show responsiveness to U.S.
security perceptions and fulfilled a double purpose for Russia in this sense. Russia's public statements against unhelpful pressure on Iran entailed advocacy for a security culture that resisted U.S. hegemony, while Moscow still managed to steer a course that was avoiding outright rejection of U.S. policies. In analysing Russian Iran policy, it thus seems useful to make out a distinction between a discursive level (public advocacy for a security culture that is resisting hegemony), and a behavioral level (eventual approval for UNSC sanctions resolutions and a renouncement of unwavering support for the Iranian position), which will be elaborated upon more extensively in the following sections.
Moscow's Approach to UNSC Sanctions and Reaction to U.S. and E.U. Unilateral Sanctions: Normative Divergence
In accordance with the Russian hesitance when it comes to international sanctions against Iran, Moscow has always reiterated the importance of dialogue and diplomacy, rejecting a military solution to the crisis and calling on Iran to comply with the IAEA. In addition to braking the sanctions track, Moscow has thus (in tandem with China) worked toward weakening their impact by watering down provisions contained in the UNSC resolution drafts (Kuchins and Weitz, 2009, 176 ).
Moscow's eventual support for pressure and sanctions on Iran was a double-edged sword: Russia appeared to heed to U.S. concerns about the Iranian nuclear activities and, unofficially, made sure that it would remain the exclusive provider of nuclear fuel for Iran by slowing down Iran's nuclear advances. At the same time, it angered the Iranians and shattered any illusion that Russia was a reliable ally and would always protect Tehran from Western pressure. In Tehran, the impression was fuelled that the Iranian nuclear programme constituted a 'bargaining chip' for Moscow and that 'Russia is intentionally stalling in dealing with Iran to wring concessions from the United States' (Mousavian, 2012, 93 (Parsi, 2012, 126; Mousavian, 2012, 397) . Russia was taken by surprise and therefore angered by the Iranian lack of transparency, but was also not pleased by the fact that Western intelligence sources had not been shared with Moscow (ibid. (Mousavian, 2012, 335; Kuchins and Weitz, 2009, 168; Patrikarakos, 2012, 256) . President Medvedev's public reaction to a secret letter by Obama about such an Iranmissile shield bargain indicated that Moscow was not happy to publicly discuss the matter (Clinton 2014, 235) .
Russia was and is skeptical of the use of sanctions as a means of pressuring Iran into compliance. In contrast to Russia's grudging acceptance of international sanctions, however, unilateral sanctions as imposed by the U.S. and the E.U., it is being reiterated from the Russian foreign ministry, are not seen as legitimate instruments of international politics (Russian foreign ministry, 2012; Medvedev, 2010; Reuters, 2010; Sheridan, 2009 While Moscow criticizes the political effects of sanctions, its compliance with the latter appears to be selective and dependent on the U.S. position, the impact of sanctions on Russia, and the nature of the sanctions adopted (unilateral or international).
The following section will put such an interplay between material and normative considerations for Russia's sanctions policy into the wider perspective of Russia's public diplomacy surrounding the Iran case and introduce the idea of Russian mediation as a final element that adds to Russia's security culture on Iran. The article therewith weaves together the discursive and the behavioral dimensions of a two-level model to understand Russian Iran policy. This will answer the question how Russia's foreign policy towards Iran's nuclear programme is illustrative of a security culture that resists hegemony. The depiction of Russia's role in the Iran dossier as being that of a veto-player indulgent with the Iranians would therefore be a fallacy. In its official diplomacy, Russia was always emphasizing the need to find a political solution to the nuclear crisis through dialogue.
Russia in the Iranian
Proposals such as the creation of an international fuel center on Russian soil by president
Putin are a case in point (Diakov, 2007, 135f.; ElBaradei, 2011, 137) . Russian officials stress that Moscow has introduced several constructive proposals in the search for solutions to the Iran nuclear crisis, some of which are known (like Lavrov's 'step-by-step' plan in 2011 or the proposal for an international fuel consortium in 2006), while others are unknown to the public and were circulated within the P5+1 format.
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Reiterating the importance of constructive dialogue and Moscow's contribution to that end, Russian foreign ministry officials noted the similarity between the proposal discussed in Geneva in November 2013 and Lavrov's earlier step-by-step proposal. 13 In line with Russia's desire to be perceived as a responsible global power, such interpretations reflect on Moscow's willingness to be seen as a cooperative and pragmatic dialogue partner in the Iranian nuclear file. Seyed Hossein Mousavian (2012) even writes that it was a strategic mistake of the West not to have given the Russian 'step-by-step' plan more consideration (457).
Especially during the Medvedev administration, Russia managed to highlight issue
areas for closer cooperation with the West and nurtured the impression of Moscow as a constructive dialogue partner in the Iran dossier, but also in the U.S.-Russian dialogue in security affairs in general. In the case of the controversy over the Iranian nuclear programme, the non-delivery of the S-300 defense system to Iran, which would allow the interception of long-range missiles to an even greater extent than the S-200 system does, was such an example of a slightly more accommodating foreign policy toward Western security political concerns. The cancellation of the S-300 delivery was a major annoyance for Iran with which Russia squandered a good deal of its 'leverage power' over Tehran. But as was also shown above, this should not necessarily be attributed to an ideational convergence of Western and Another scenario is that of a resolution of the nuclear issue without a broader political normalization of Iran's relations with the West, which could create an 'empty space' in Iran, possibly to be filled by Russian investments. 18 However, it has been pointed out that the Russian-Iranian trade volume does not account for a big share on either side's external trade balance: Russia's trade with Israel almost reaches numbers comparable with Russian-Iranian trade, despite the fact that Israel's population is ten times smaller than Iran's (Sazhin 2010 ).
The Iranian-Turkish trade volume is seven times higher than the Russian-Iranian; Iran's trade volume with China is even 13 times higher than the one with Russia.
Third, and arguably the most important reason from a global power and prestige perspective, Russia's self-understanding of being an unavoidable global power player enters into the calculation about the direction Russia's Iran policy ought to take. Russia, as a permanent UNSC member, wants to be understood as a state among equals. In line with Sakwa's concept of 'neo-revisionism', it is understood here that Russia's working with international organizations of the U.N. system does not constitute an appeal by Moscow to fundamentally challenge the system of international governance, but to partially revise its functioning (Sakwa, 2011; 2015, 28-31) . This observation ties in with the distinction made earlier between 'rules and models' versus 'norms and values' (Katzenstein, 1996, 21) . While Russia and its Western counterparts in the P5+1 framework occasionally appear to be standing on two opposite ends of the spectrum of political instruments when it comes to approaching Iran. As this article has shown, however, taking such disagreements as signs of an unalterable freezing into mutually opposed camps and portraying Russia as a cumbersome veto player in the UNSC, blocking and derailing Western negotiation efforts, does not do justice to much more complex foreign policy positions that have to bridge official discourse(s) with largely material, global power political and security motivations. This two-level foreign policy between a discursive level advocating non-hegemonic governance models, and a behavioral level on which Russia takes policy decisions that run counter to that ideal underlines the complexities of Russia's Iran policy that cannot solely be captured by a policy of 'resistance to hegemony'.
Russia's Iran policy is an illustration of a state's foreign policy that challenges hegemonic structures, but works within the system of governance inspired by the U.S. It is an example of a friction between contestation and accommodation, between resistance and consent. Russia's search for a foreign policy identity, like that of any other state, is an iterative process as the outcome of the state's international context, its self-understanding, and the perception thereof by other actors. 'Security' is always contextual, ideas and identities always co-constructed by the social environment, and policy decision never taken in a vacuum. This finding explains the seeming variation in Russia's Iran policy, where the advocacy for a security culture that resists hegemony does not always coincide with divergence from hegemonic structures on a behavioral level. solution to Iran's nuclear status has shifted. Russian opposition to such a final nuclear status, therefore, may be deviating from U.S. foreign policy. For analytical purposes, however, the reference point is Russia's compliance with its own discourse (behavioral inconsistency with a discursive level), instead of U.S. positions seemingly undergoing changes. Concerning the latter, it is argued that hegemonic structures still remain in place insofar as changing negotiation positions do not yet account for an overhaul of hegemonic structures. The sanctions regime is a forceful case in point.
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